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Is Autopoietic Systems Theory Alexithymic? 
Luhmann and the Socio-Psychology of Emotions1
Zusammenfassung: Nach einer kritischen Sichtung der Luhmann’schen Überlegungen
zum Phänomen der Emotionen wird eine Theorie entwickelt, die emotionale Prozesse
in einer Zone der strukturellen Kopplung von organischem, psychischem und sozia-
lem System lokalisiert. Die Theorie lenkt die Aufmerksamkeit auf einen substantiellen
historischen Zusammenhang von (legalen oder moralischen) Rechten und Emotionen.
Dieser Zusammenhang wird durch einige Beispiele illustriert, die sich mit spezifischen
Emotionen und einem allgemeinen Konzept von Emotionen beschäftigen.
Introduction
›Alexithymia‹ describes a series of psycho-behavioural characteristics
that are expressed in the etymology of the word itself: from the Greek
a- (lack), lexis- (word) and thymos- (mood, feeling or emotion), alex-
ithymia means literally ›without words for emotions‹. The main char-
acteristics of alexithymia can be summarized … as: difficulty in identi-
fying and describing feelings; difficulty in distinguishing between
feelings and the bodily sensations of emotional arousal…; constricted
imaginative processes…; and an externally oriented cognitive style
(Greco 2001, 471).
The question of the extent to which Luhmann’s general systems theory is
›blind‹ to what are called emotions and their effects, has been raised by Luc
Ciompi in his paper Ein blinder Fleck bei Niklas Luhmann? (2004). Although
Ciompi does not go so far as to diagnose the theory as alexithymic, it is inter-
esting to note the extent to which his observations correspond to the main
characteristics of this construct, which Taylor et al. (1991) describe as a »poten-
tial paradigm for psychosomatic medicine«. Hence Ciompi argues that,
despite having focussed on topics with evident affective content such as love,
trust and conflict, Luhmann conspicuously fails to address the emotional
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aspects involved (»difficulty in identifying and describing feelings«?). He fur-
ther suggests that the few comments Luhmann does make about emotions
are founded upon a scientifically out of date description that significantly
underestimates the pivotal role played by affective factors in psychic and in
social systems alike. The main identified shortcoming of this dated scientific
description is that it presents a false picture of emotions as essentially undif-
ferentiated visceral activation (»difficulty in distinguishing between feelings
and the bodily sensations of emotional arousal«?). Further, although Luh-
mann’s work can hardly be considered unimaginative, Ciompi strongly
implies that it is preoccupied with a description of the externalities of the com-
munication processes of social systems at the expense of a concern with the
supposed underlying causal driving force2 (»an externally oriented cognitive
style«?).
The at once peripheral and flawed role emotions play in Luhmann’s theorizing
should, to sum up Ciompi’s argument, be identified as a fundamental weak-
ness and rectified by use of Ciompi’s own autopoietic systems theory of the
fractal nature of affect-logic. According to the latter, the emotions are funda-
mental to social and psychological life. That is to say, emotions serve not only
to organise and integrate the psychic and social domains, but also to motivate
and energize at both of these levels of autopoietic operation. If Ciompi’s
account is correct, Luhmann’s alleged blind spot regarding the role of emo-
tions in the autopoiesis of consciousness and communication is also his
›Achilles‘ heel‹. It cannot, in other words, be dismissed as one of those logi-
cally inevitable ›unmarked spaces‹ which are the condition of possibility for
any point of observation, since to fail to observe a phenomenon whose logic
(always-already multiply combined with cognition, memory, social behaviour
and so forth) purportedly organises, integrates and motivates psychic and
social systems, is to miss the very motor3 of those systems whose operational
medium is meaning. Given the serious theoretical implications of a retrospec-
tive diagnosis of alexythymia in Luhmann’s work, a second opinion is required
before any course of treatment (fundamental revisions of core concepts, for
instance) is recommended.The following paper offers a second opinion from a
point of view structured by the marked and unmarked spaces proper to a
British social psychologist with a research specialism in the emotions and an
interest in Luhmann’s work. A first section will outline and critically assess
Luhmann’s account of the emotions.This will concentrate only on the relevant
sections in Social Systems, since Ciompi has already provided an overview of
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2 »Die Frage, welche Kräfte hinter den aufgezeigten Veränderungen am Werk sein könnten,
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Organisatoren – man könnte auch sagen die energetischen Letztelemente – aller Sozio-
wie Psychodynamik.« (41-2).
Luhmann’s various discussions of emotion. A second section will present an
amended general account of emotions that avoids the narrow cognitivism of
Luhmann’s account, but which remains faithful to his broader theoretical
commitments. A final section will offer some suggestions as to what a socio-
psychology of emotions informed by Luhmann might look like. The task of
assessing Ciompi’s fascinating alternative theory of emotions remains for the
future.
Is Luhmann’s account of the emotions outdated?
The emotions, Luhmann states, represent a »sphere of problems that until
now have proved quite difficult for sociology« (1995, 274). For this reason, he
suggests, they have typically either been omitted from research, treated using
unconventional methods, or studied indirectly in terms of their social stimula-
tion, communication, cooling out, and so on. In Social Systems he dedicates a
few paragraphs to the problem of emotions as such in the chapter on the indi-
viduality of psychic systems. This chapter is itself peripheral to the main project
of a theory of social systems, since its focus is primarily on consciousness
rather than communication. Hence it should be recognised that for Luhmann
the emotions represent a peripheral aspect of a peripheral theme since, as a
sociologist, he is happy to articulate an account according to which the true
nature of emotion is psychic.
In this context, emotion is first introduced as »the process of adaptation to ful-
filment or disappointment« of claims. The concept of claim is elucidated as a
sub-category of expectation, the latter being the form in which a system
exposes itself to its indeterminable environment. By way of expectations, psy-
chic systems and also, as I will discuss later, social systems bring the environ-
ment into a form that can be used operatively on a psychic level. That is to say,
possibilities are projected which can be confirmed or disconfirmed, fulfilled or
disappointed. For psychic systems, expectations thus organise the autopoiesis
of consciousness by ›probabilising‹ the improbabilility of environmental com-
plexity through the pre-structuring of connections between conscious con-
tents. Expectations act as grids that pre-structure given unmanageable com-
plexity into an autopoietically operable form.That is to say, a given expectation
yields a simple bifurcation in the face of the world: it is disappointed or it is
fulfilled
A claim is a condensed form of expectation in which self-commitment is
increased, and with it vulnerability. Claims thus presuppose the autopoietic
connectivity already organised by expectations, and re-enter it into the con-
sciousness of the psychic system. A claim would hence be an expectation with
enhanced salience – an expectation that is owned. The ownership of expecta-
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tion suggested by the concept of claim also implies the additional complexity
of a sense of right. If a claim is an expectation we feel a right to, then it must be
recognised that we are dealing with a primal notion of right (a ›proto-right‹)
prior to its division into moral, legal and epistemic orders. This point will be
central to a later part of this paper, since I believe that Luhmann’s main contri-
bution to a socio-psychology of emotion results from attention to the struc-
tural coupling of communication and consciousness whereby concepts of right
organise the shaping of the psychic by the social. For now, it is enough to state
that, for Luhmann, the shift from expectation to claim increases the probability
of the experience of emotion, just as a retreat from claim to mere expectation
reduces it.
Having argued the highly cognitive case for emotions being effectively the
process of adaptation to the disappointment or fulfilment of claims, Luhmann
goes on to develop the more specific and controversial thesis that emotions
function as an immune system for psychic life. According to this second argu-
ment emotions »arise and grip body and consciousness when the autopoiesis
of consciousness is in danger« (1995, 274).This adds a new layer of depth to the
account of emotion, since on one level there is no reason to suppose that the
disappointment or fulfilment of claims should threaten psychic autopoiesis
(not least since this has already been presented as a condition of possibility for
psychic autopoiesis). On another level, however, these two arguments can be
made to converge. Given the role expectations and claims play in organising
the autopoiesis of consciousness, any decline in the capacity of claims to
›probabilise‹ an operable conscious world would constitute a threat to the
autopoiesis of consciousness as such. That is to say, given that, like any
autopoiesis, the autopoiesis of consciousness occurs only on condition of an
improbable reduction in complexity that yields a circular flow of connectible
elements, any interruptions to this flow caused by irruptions of unexpected
complexity and contingency pose a threat to that flow.
In this respect, Luhmann’s account can be clarified using the signal/noise ter-
minology of information theory. Such destructive interruptions can be thought
of as noise to the signal required by existing autopoiesis (which is not to deny
the earlier possibility that an interruption may also be grasped as signal, since
all information theory only makes sense in relation to the position of an
observer). Such interruptions may assume any form from a physical external
danger, or a social faux pas, to a revolutionary new piece of information. What
matters is only that the relatively predictable stream of consciousness is dis-
rupted. Then, according to Luhmann, emotion will occur, since emotions are
nothing but »the psychic system’s self-interpretation with regard to whether
its operation can continue« (1995, 274). This implies that emotions constitute
an alternate observer position from which the autopoiesis-destroying noise of
interruption is converted or rectified into a temporary signal.
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It is important to emphasise that this line of argument leads to a conception of
emotions as radically internal to the psychic system. Emotions are not con-
cerned with the environment but with grasping-as-signal the noise that
would otherwise disrupt the ongoing operations of the psychic system or, put
differently, with the noise that the psychic system would otherwise become
through disruption. Better the self-generated scream of fear and shutting of
eyes than a confrontation with a more primordial and unrecognisable noise.
On this account, just as lymphocytes absorb foreign bodies in the immune
system, emotions ›digest‹ noise, transforming it into a simplified field of con-
sciousness that bridges what would otherwise be a chasm into which con-
sciousness might plunge. When stability is re-established, emotions die away,
having fulfilled their order-restoring purpose. In an argument reminiscent of
Sartre’s (1993) case for the magic nature of emotions, Luhmann suggests that
they thus secure the continuation of autopoiesis with »unusual means« (such
as dispensing with subtle discriminations and the need to decide on the basis
of a consideration of consequences). Luhmann is clear in his insistence on this
internal role: »Emotions are not representations that refer to the environment
but internal adaptations to internal problem situations in the psychic system
that concern the ongoing production of the system’s elements by the system’s
elements« (1995, 274).
It is no simple matter to assess the validity of Luhmann’s rapidly sketched
theory of emotion. For one thing, although many strong claims have been
advanced, scientists are still far from a consensual understanding of emotion.
George Mandler (2002) sums up a lifetime of authoritative research in the
field with the somewhat resigned statement that »even if one believes in the
notion of human progress, there is little evidence of a focus or consensus in
the psychology of emotion«. Another reason for being wary of claims to the
truth of emotion is that the field has also been conspicuously subject to influ-
ences of a broadly ideological4 nature. Paul Fraisse (1968), for instance, talks
of »les deux faces de l’émotion« in referring to a bifurcation in the research
tradition between those who view the organic aspects of emotion as effects of
psychic events, and those who accord physiological events a primary causal
role. Luhmann’s theory leans towards the first of these options, following in
the broadly Herbartian tradition. On the other hand, another long-standing
›classical/romantic‹ bifurcation separates those, such as Cannon (1929) and
Hebb (1946), for whom the emotions are essentially disruptive and irrational
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4 Here I use ideology in the sense discussed by Tomkins (1981, 306): »Any organised set of
ideas about which human beings are at once both articulate and passionate and about
which they are least certain«. The current excitement over the use of scanning technologies
such as FMRI to generate real-time images of emotional-brains-in-action should only
redouble our concern over the ideologically saturated nature of scientific knowledge of
emotion. When rapidly accumulating data awaits an adequate theory, scientific ideology, in
Canguilhem’s sense, is at a maximum.
(cf. Averill 1974), from those, such as Ekman/Friesen (1971) and Izard (1971),
for whom they are the key source of human value (cf. Fridlund/Duchaine,
1996). As we have seen, Luhmann’s theory paradoxifies this latter distinction
by presenting emotions as effectively an order generating response to disor-
der.
Caveats aside, it is certainly not the case that Luhmann’s theory is without
support amongst contemporary students of emotion. Regarding the distinc-
tion between expectations and claims, a similar, though greatly simplified, idea
is present in Frijda’s (2001) currently influential concept of the »law of con-
cern« in relation to emotions. This is the (somewhat tautological) observation
that before one can be affected emotionally by an event one must care about it.
Regarding the immune-system analogy, it should be noted that Mandler’s
(1999) constructivist theory holds that emotions are constructions the psychic
(,cognitive‹) system generates from the physiological states of arousal that fol-
low interruptions to cognitive events and plans and/or organized response
sequences. Although Mandler does not go so far as to conceive cognitive
events on the model of a fully-fledged self-generating autopoietic system, the
resemblance to Luhmann’s theory is clear: emotions are internal responses to
interruptions to hypothesised cognitive processes. Like Mandler, Luhmann
suggests a mediating role for autonomic arousal in this process (1995, 274).
Although this remains un-stated in Luhmann’s theory, physiological
responses could be said to play the role of amplifiers of psychic interruptions.
The interruption amplified by autonomic arousal thus constitutes a new inter-
ruption which, as it were, interrupts the first, thus rendering the psychic sys-
tem immune. Also like Mandler, he insists that emotions are more than »inter-
preted biochemistry« since they play this specific intrapsychic role of
managing interruption (although Mandler’s continued focus on organized
response sequences keeps his theory ambiguous as to whether emotions
respond to the environment or solely to internal problem situations). In mak-
ing this case, Luhmann himself draws upon the work of Karl Pribram, which
continues to exert a powerful influence today: »these internal adjustments are
felt as emotions« (Pribram 1971, 208).
In summary, Luhmann’s theory is far from incompatible with some of the cur-
rently dominant conceptualisations of emotion, notably those that stress a
›cognitive‹ basis. Nevertheless, to my mind, it shares weaknesses with this
cognitive tradition. Emotion is rendered highly vague and typically described
generically rather than in terms of specific emotions. This is compounded by a
problematic reliance upon a controversial idea promulgated by Schachter/
Singer (1962), which supplied a radical departure point for modern cognitive
theories. Namely, that all emotions are essentially unitary and homogenous
with respect to their physiological grounding in patterns of physiological
arousal (cf. Luhmann 1995, 274, note 44). On this blank organic canvas, as it
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were, the cognitive system draws the meaningful distinctions that supposedly
give rise to or individuate particular emotions in their specificity. This remark-
ably Cartesian position gives organic systems a crude and passive role com-
pared to the constructive and active part allocated to cognitive processing. The
data upon which Schachter and Singer’s theory was based is seriously flawed,
and far from compelling. Nevertheless, it was not seriously challenged until
over 15 years after its publication (Maslach 1978). Since then it has been pro-
foundly criticized on numerous occasions (see especially Tomkins 1981). It has
not been successfully replicated, and has been backed up with only marginal
empirical support (Reisenzein 1983). Even at time of publication, Schachter
and Singer were working with a radically over-simplified conception of
arousal (compare with Sprague et al. 1961), the plausibility of which was
achieved only by negative ideological contrast with the previously dominant
debates within learning theory (Tomkins 1981). There is indeed something
›alexithymic‹ about a theory that insists that experiences as different as joy and
rage are in fact identical but for different ›appraisals‹ laid on the same
›arousal‹. As put by Tomkins (1981, 311): »It is as reasonable a possibility as a
theory of pain and pleasure which argued that the difference between the pain
of a toothache and the pleasure of an orgasm is not in the stimulation of dif-
ferent sensory receptors, but in the fact that since one experience occurs in a
bedroom, the other in a dentist’s office, one interprets the undifferentiated
arousal state differently«.
In the light of the above, Luhmann doubtless gave a hostage to fortune when
he discussed Schachter and Singer’s findings as »perhaps the most important
insight« grounding his theory (1995, 274). The over-stated cognitivism that
results leaves Luhmann vulnerable to criticism concerning his ignorance both
of a systemic integrity proper to particular emotions at the organic level, and of
the simultaneously developed realisation of the profoundly social aspect of the
emotions. This is particularly unfortunate given that both of these positions
have acquired forceful plausibility in recent years (see Damasio 1994; LeDoux,
1995 and Greenwood 2000, for the former, and Lutz/Abu-Lughod 1990; Harré
& Parrott 1996, and Bendelow/ Williams 1998 for the latter).
In the following section I will therefore briefly outline an ammended account
of the emotions that is faithful to Luhmann’s broader theoretical commit-
ments but not subject to the above criticisms. This amendment is based upon
an emphasis of the role of emotion in each of the three basic and structurally
circular modes of autopoiesis clarified by Luhmann. This should not be mis-
taken as one more mere affirmation of the existence of different ›levels of
analysis‹ (Averill 1982; Keltner/Haidt 1999). In stressing the simultaneously
organic, conscious and communicative aspects of emotions it becomes possible
to observe the liminal role they play as a parasitical irritant provoking both the
differentiation and the coupling of these otherwise radically distinct and
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strictly autonomous forms of autopoietic operation. Understanding this role
will require overcoming the paradox of having to insist on the distinct nature
of these three domains of autopoietic ordering, whilst at the same time stress-
ing that any concrete emotional event must involve the simultaneous, recipro-
cal and overlapping ordering effects of all three. It is here that the philosophy
of Michel Serres can usefully supplement that of Luhmann. If Luhmann
emphasises the need to analytically distinguish social, psychic and organic
systemic levels, then Serres stresses that any such clear distinction risks miss-
ing ›where the action is‹. Namely, in the threshold activities and spaces of
transformation that Serres, in different works, identifies with the figures of
Hermes (1992), parasites (1982) and angels (1995).5 Emotions, I argue, repre-
sent a threshold zone or domain in which the norms of social systems are
bundled together with states of consciousness and bodily processes. As such,
it is their chief characteristic not to be categorisable using such standard
dualisms as »innate versus learned« or »natural versus social«. Having out-
lined this theoretical reorientation I will go on to show that it opens up, via
Luhmann’s theory of social systems, a powerful way of revisioning the socio-
psychology of emotions.
Emotions as threshold phenomena between 
the organic, psychic and social
The paradox of the parasite: 
General overview of Luhmann’s three parallel operative levels
In Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic, self-organising systems, the organic, the
psychic and the social are to be treated as fully self-referential and self-pro-
ducing systemic levels. These systems are operatively closed with respect to
one another since their autopoiesis operates with different media or materials:
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5 This difference in emphasis between the two thinkers is evident in their respective stances
on systems. For Luhmann (1995, 13) »The following considerations assume that there are
systems«. For Serres (1982, 73) »Maybe there is or never was a system … The only
instances or systems are black boxes. When we do not understand, when we defer our
knowledge to a later date, when the thing is too complex for the means at hand, when we
put everything in a temporary black box, we prejudge the existence of a system. When we
finally open the box, we see that it works like a space of transformation. The only systems,
instances, and substances come from our lack of knowledge. The system is nonknow-
ledge. The other side of nonknowledge. One side of nonknowledge is chaos; the other,
system. Knowledge forms a bridge between the two banks. Knowledge as such is a space
of transformation«. Nevertheless, a systems theoretical affirmation that there are no sys-
tems is a thoroughly Luhmannian paradox, grounded in the recognition that the opera-
tions of any given system are ultimately de-paradoxifying strategies doomed to an even-
tual return to paradox.
organic processes in the case of biological systems, consciousness (Gedanken)
in the case of psychic systems, and communication in the case of social sys-
tems. The problem of the mutual inter(re)ference between distinct operative
levels is cast in the biological terminology of structural coupling. Inter(re)fer-
ence by structural coupling is necessarily indirect, since each operative level
functions only as environment to the others. Nevertheless, consciousness, for
instance, can irritate or otherwise indirectly stimulate the system of communi-
cation that is its environment. Likewise organic activity can irritate conscious-
ness. To use Serres’ (1982) terminology, such irritation is always parasitical in
the literal sense of on the side (para/ site). Such parasitical irritations are con-
stantly occuring at the invisible thresholds between discrete operative levels,
and serve to mutually structure these levels through incessant provocation. In
any given act of communication, consciousness is already fully present, and so
are the organic operations of neurophysiology. Yet, to put it somewhat poeti-
cally, they pass each other by like ships in the night, silently altering their
mutual courses by way of the waves their movements cause in the shared
medium of the ocean. Each operative level is distinct (only consciousness is
conscious, only communication communicates), but without consciousness,
there can be no communication, and without brain biochemistry, there can be
no consciousness.
Evolutionarily speaking, and without forgetting their eventual mutual provo-
cation to higher levels of complexity, organic systems are more basic than sys-
tems of consciousness, which in turn are more basic than systems of commu-
nication. More basic than all is the primordial noise (unstructured or chaotic
multiplicity) from which all systems are born (as the reduction of multiplicity
and the creation of a complexity differential betweeen system and environment,
Luhmann 1995) and to which all systems return (Serres 1998). If systems exist
on the edge, or on the side, of noise, then it is reasonable, in abstract terms, to
label the act of system formation as the act of parasiting noise. A system is a
parasite that, by digesting noise, renders it operable as material for the ongo-
ing renewal of the system. In ordering noise and transforming it into what
passes for signal, emergent systems become fertile ground to be parasited in
turn by new systems. As a result of parasiting a parasite, such new systems can
afford a higher level of complexity. We hence have an evolutionary principle
that takes the form of a parasitical cascade that would resemble the sequence
of integrated interlocking entities described by François Jacob (1976), and that
would remain consistent with von Foerster’s (1960) principle of order from
noise.
In this sense, we can abstractly concieve of consciousness as having parasited
organic life, and of communication as having parasited consciousness. The
change in the basic materials made use of by autopoiesis at each level would
be a function of the increase of complexity enabled by the adpotion of a limi-
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nal parasitical position6. From this para position, the production of order
achieved by the parasited system can be taken for granted by its parasite, and
transcended. A new system thus emerges parallel to the old. Serres has pro-
posed just such a model in a bold attempt – influenced by Henri Atlan’s bio-
logical application of information theory (e.g. 1974) – to explain the origin of
language:
Consider any level of an interlocking system. Locally ... it operates like
a series of chemical reactions at a certain temperature. Let us forget for
the moment their precise equations and the unique elements at work
here. Let us consider only the energy conditions at this one level. It
mobilizes information and produces background noise. The next level
in the interlocking series recieves, manipulates, and generally
integrates the information-background noise couple that was given off
at the preceding level. How does this take place? Several recent studies
alow us to elucideate the answer to this question ... Indeed, if one
writes the equation expressing the quantity of information exchanged
between two stations through a given channel and the equation which
provides this quantity for the whole unit (including the two stations
and the channel), a change of sign occurs for a certain function
entering into the computation. In other words, this function, called
ambiguity and resulting from noise, changes when the observer
changes his point of observation. Its value depends on whether he is
submerged in the first level or whether he examines the entire unit
from the next level. In a certain sense, the next level functions as a
rectifier, in particular, as a rectifier of noise. What was once an obstacle
to all messages is reversed and added to the information. This
discovery is all the more important since it is valid for all levels. It is a
law of the series which runs through the system of integration (Serres
1992, 77).
In this account, systems both emerge from noise and are perpetually provoked
into complexificaton by noise. A system is a space for the transformation of
noise. Here it is relevant that, in French, parasite also means what the English
call static (the noise that interferes with a transmitted signal). In this sense, Ser-
res’concept of the parasite serves as a useful supplement to Luhmann’s funda-
mental concept of paradox. Luhmann repeatedly stresses that paradox is the
generating principle of autopoiesis, to the extent that autopoietic operations
must be grasped as essentially de-paradoxifying (Teubner in press). If the
improbable circular operations of autopoiesis are to continue, the paralyzing
logical perplexity of paradox must be overcome (Clam 2001). Systems, to
repeat my theme in Luhmannian terms, are thus born from paradox, provoked
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new logic. He crosses the exchange, makes it into a diagonal« (Serres 1982, 35).
into complexification by paradox, and inevitably return to paradox. It seems
plausible that Luhmann’s concept of paradox was articulated with systems
that operate with meaning in mind. Supplementing it with Serres’ concept of
the parasite extends that plausibility to organic and physical systems. The
basic, grounding paradox is that order emerges from noise and owes its
preservation to excluded (digested, rectified) noise. The paradox of the parasite
is that it is both the pathological principle of the interruption and destruction
of order, and the constructive, consolidating principle of its emergence and
evolution. In the final analysis, system is indistinguishable from noise: para-
site.7
Affects as the organic constitutive outside of consciousness
The above enables a view of emotions as threshold phenomena between Luh-
mann’s three operative levels or domains of ordering. As phenomena of the
threshold, they exist neither completely outside nor completely inside social,
psychic or organic systems. Indeed, they function as what I will call the consti-
tutive outside of each system. Biology, in this sense, is the constitutive outside
of conciousness in the precise sense that one (e.g. biology) does not belong
within the other (e.g. consciousness), yet the other (consciousness) cannot
exist without it (biology). But, in Luhmannian terms, the emergence of con-
sciousness from organic life is itself a paradoxical solution to the paradox of
the impossibility of full biological self-reference (Clam 2001, 52). One could
speculate that the evolution of something like consciousness became biologi-
cally necessary the moment the complexity of the environment overwhelmed
the capacity of an organism to adapt successfully using only genetically
encoded ›knowledge‹.
Hence the first argument I wish to make is that emotions form precisely a par-
asitical coupling between the organic and the conscious (although they were
by no means the first of such couplings). Emotions can be thought of as a bio-
logical means of generating a distinctly psychological level of functioning that
is precisely no longer understandable as an organic process. For the sake of
clarity, we might refer to emotions in their organic manifestation as affects. On
a psychic level, different affects take the form of distinct subjective forms of
consciousness (emotions). Whatever Schacter and Singer have claimed, the
phenomenological world of fear could not be more distinct from that of joy. It
seems reasonable to assume that any motivational role played by affects is
mediated by the rewarding or unrewarding nature of their conscious experi-
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7 »Theorem: noise gives rise to a new system, an order that is more complex than the simple
chain. The parasite interrupts at first glance, consolidates when you look again … such a
parasite is responsible for the growth of the system’s complexity, such a parasite stops it …
are we in the pathology of systems or in their emergence and evolution?« (Serres 1982, 14).
ence. This point was most persuasively developed by Silvan Tomkins (1963),
who made a detailed comparison between what he called the affect system
and the drive system.8 Like the so called »drive signals« of thirst, hunger and
so on, the affects are part of a biological system which appears to be specifi-
cally designed to perform the still poorly understood transmutation from
organic operation to conscious report. The affect of distress forms conscious-
ness in a way that is comparable to the signal of so-called physical pain. In
both cases the resultant conscious report, provided it enters awareness, is
motivational in nature: it feels bad and is to be avoided.
It is evident that drives solve the big evolutionary problem of how to maintain
a biological system in equilibrium in the absence of knowledge that can be
organically ›built in‹9. Most bodily processes are silent in the sense that they
do not require conscious report: the blood ›knows‹ how to clot just as the
digestive system ›knows‹ how to process food. But a conscious report like pain
or hunger is precisely required when ›built in‹ information is inadequate for
the solution of the problem of maintaining equilibrium. In such circumstances
a drive signal is put to use which »beats on the door of consciousness until the
person is goaded into some activity which will meet the body’s needs«
(Tomkins 1963, 31). Like drives, the affects generate consciousness by way of
stimulations of specific organic regions. If the sex drive recruits the highly sen-
sitive flesh of the genitals, nipples, ear-lobes, etc, then an affect like shame
recruits the sensitivities of a face engorged with the blood of a blush. The face
of the human being, as Darwin (1872) made clear, is a hyper-sensitive and
finely muscled surface, developed through evolution and recruited to the task
of the experience and expression of affects. Here we see a specific example of
the parasitism of the organic by the psychic. The noise of the body is rectified
into signal for consciousness. Regardless of LeDoux’s (1995) efforts to separate
the organic from the conscious aspects of affects, the affects are situated at this
moment of rectification.
Emotions as the conscious constitutive outside of communication
Evidence for the organic and evolved nature of affects is clear the first moment
we come into the world. Each of us, with perhaps one or two exceptions, is lit-
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8 My account draws heavily on Silvan Tomkins, since he is one of the few well established
psychologists of emotion to have developed a fully fledged systems theoretical perspec-
tive. For this reason he is typically poorly understood by colleagues, whose ignorance of
the fine details of his work is compounded by the routine misspelling of his name! (for
Oatley/Jenkins 1996 and Mandler (in press), he is Sylvan Tomkins, whilst for Stearns/
Stearns 1988, he is Silvan Tompkins).
9 For Tomkins, a key evolutionary function of the affect system is to amplify drive signals
which might otherwise be too weak. Hence the sex drive can be amplified with the affect
of excitement, or enjoyment (or can be dampened with shame).
erally born crying in distress. It stretches plausibility to imagine that the new-
born has already learned this clearly affective and highly specialised response,
or that it is the product of the kind of complex cognitive appraisal mechanism
required by Lazarus (1984). Specific affects have also been traced to specific
regions of the brain. For instance, using tracer technology, LeDoux (e.g. 1995)
was able to show that fear-relevant information from the auditory thalamus is
passed on to the lateral amygdala for further processing. However, perhaps the
best evidence for the existence of a discrete set of so-called biologically hard-
wired affects is that these can be linked to a set of universally recognisable
facial displays (Ekman/Friesen 1971; Izard, 1971; but see Ortony/Turner 1990
and Fridlund/Duchaine 1996 for critiques).This leads to my second point. Emo-
tions do not simply constitute a coupling of organic processes to consciousness.
They also represent a threshold at which an organic system-made-conscious is
harnessed to the project of social communication. If the smile of joy, the tears of dis-
tress and the blush of shame are potentials that are organically inscribed in the
facial musculature, then this is because such affects play a proto-communicative
role. This applies also to the vocalizations specific to affects, such as the laugh-
ter of joy, the gasp of excitement and the scream of fear. The communicative
value of the neonate’s unlearned cry of distress is as undeniable as that of their
red, distorted, tearful face. More than this, it seems also that even neonates are
able to respond in kind to the facial displays and vocalizations of affect of oth-
ers (Oatley/Jenkins 1996; Meltzoff/Moore 1977). In the form of so-called
»emotional contagion« (Hatfield et al. 1994), the emotions thus supply the
organic system and its parasitical consciousness with a proto-communicative,
pre-linguistic propensity towards sociality.
In sum, just as biology is the constitutive outside of consciousness, so con-
sciousness is the constitutive outside of communication. This also is compat-
able with the relevant basic Luhmannian paradox. For Luhmann, communica-
tion is the solution to the paradox of the impossibility of individual
consciousnesses every experiencing one another, despite their fundamental
isomorphism.The solution represented by communication is itself paradoxical,
since the social system is only able to de-paradoxify the isolation of conscious-
ness at the price of commiting the interlocuters to a medium of communica-
tion which forever escapes consciousness (see Clam 2000, 71).10 In summary,
communication de-paradoxifies concsiousness, and consciousness de-para-
doxifies organic life, each the parasite of the other. In each case emotions play
the role of the parasitical transformer which refers the organic to conscious-
ness and both to communication.
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10 If Husserl demonstrated the impossibility of getting outside of consciousness once it
becomes one’s subject matter, then Derrida does the same for language. Consciousness,
after all, is a word in language. But language is equally just an experience in conscious-
ness.
Avoidance of reductionism
The above account remains faithful to Luhmann’s theoretical corpus but is not
subject to the criticism of ignoring the fundamentally organic and social
aspects of emotion. Luhmann’s insights regarding the relationships between
expectations, claims, and emotional life remain intact and open for further
elaboration. Furthermore, it is an account that is highly resistant to being
coded into »innate versus learned« or »natural versus social« or »positivistic
versus constructionist« categories. This gives hope of immunity from the three
forms of reductionism that typify the field: biological reductionism (LeDoux
1995); reduction to consciousness (Sartre 1993); and reduction to the social
(Edwards 1999). First, if an affect system is part of our inherited organic
machinery, then it is a system designed with maximal degrees of freedom for
optimal flexibility.11 Even if it is granted that certain innate triggers of affect
exist (such as pain and hunger as triggers of distress), affects, due to their bio-
logical flexibility, rapidly take on far more complex, learned and meaningful
social objects which ›trigger‹ them just as effectively (e.g. distress at the loss of
esteem that follows a poor performance in a school play, followed by distress
at the memory of this).
Second, as part of a psychic system, emotions become directly amenable to
conscious control, cultivation, manipulation and socialization. Just as a reflex
blink can be transformed by conscious control into a deliberate wink, so can
an innate startle response or smile be consciously re-traversed to yield a prod-
uct which, from an early age, can no longer be considered ›pure‹ affect.
Indeed, because of their evident motivational nature, individuals rapidly
develop an interest in deliberately controlling both their affects and the cir-
cumstances that elicit them. All else being equal, the broad aim will be to max-
imise and sustain positive experiences of joy and excitement, whilst minimis-
ing and containing the negative affects of distress, shame, fear, disgust and
anger.12 Further, consciousness will typically be composed of combinations of
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11 Like drives, the affects reduce dependency on system-internal knowledge. But unlike dri-
ves the information they convey is general rather than specific. Hunger and thirst are spe-
cific to the deficits they signal and the drives themselves indicate the necessary remedial
action: our throat is dry in thirst, and belly rumbles in hunger. The information conveyed
by an affect like anger or distress by contrast, is general and free in the sense that one can
be angry or distressed at practically anything. This generality makes the affect system
highly flexible: »If the infant is hungry, he cries. If there is a diaper pin hurting him, he
cries. If he has just finished eating but develops gas pains, he cries. If he is tired and
sleepy, he cries« (Tomkins 1963, 42).
12 The common modern practice of watching horror-movies or taking roller-coaster rides is
evidence, I think, not of fear-seeking as such, but of a learning process whereby terror can
be contained and transformed, almost at will, into the positive thrill of excitement. Likewise,
I venture the hypothesis that the modern love of ›weepy‹ films and novels is less to do
with seeking distress than with containing and transforming the harsh dysphoria of dis-
tress into the relative sweetness of sadness. This would fit Tomkins’ claim that distress,
unlike sadness, is an innate affect.
affects into more complex conscious compounds and sequences with new
emergent dynamics irreducible to any organic precursors (Plutchik 1991).13
Third, as part of a social system, emotions will take on a communicative role
that increasingly frees them from the organic and conscious constraints which
nevertheless continue to lend them their proto-communicative potential. The
moment emotions are assumed into language they become symbolically medi-
ated, irreversibly refined and transformed, and harnessed to normative social
projects (Harré 1986; Stenner 1993). Indeed, due to their motivational role
with respect to conduct and communication, it is highly probable that the
expression of affect will be a direct question for social control and socialisation
within the communication circuits of families and wider collectives alike. This
explains why it is commonplace to find emotions a prime target, not just of
mundane pedagogical protocols, but also of the great moral, ethical and reli-
gious discourses from Aristotle’s ethics, through the Seven Deadly Sins, to
Spinoza’s ethics, Hobbes’ politics, Smiths ›moral sentiments‹, and so forth
(Stenner, in press 1 and 2).
A socio-psychology of emotions informed by Luhmann
Any adequate theory of the organic nature of affects hence opens a significant
space for the social psychology and sociology of emotions. The organic givens
of affect are transformed in and by a consciousness that works back on them.
The organic and conscious givens of affect are likewise transformed in and by
communication, which in turn works back on them. The above yields a clear
implication for any sociology or socio-psychology of emotions concerned with
the problem of how a given social system might structure the emotional possi-
bilities of individuals. Namely, following Luhmann, one should attend to the
structural coupling of social systems with psychic and organic systems. More
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13 Whatever consciousness might or might not be (and I don’t pretend an answer to this
question), it seems undoubtedly to be a complex emergent drawing upon, combining and
recombining the products of many other brain functions including those that sub-serve
perception, memory, and the higher-order cognitive feats of thought, language and the
imagination. This suggests, irrespective of any discretely identifiable biologically given
affective potentials, that any given state of consciousness will be the unification of a
hybrid affair of great mixture. It will be composed of perceptions of our encounters and of
memories of these. It will be structured by the goals and desires of our imagination. Per-
ceptions, thoughts, memories and images will each in turn be more or less emotionally
laden. And these feelings will in turn be converted into concepts and become the object
of further thoughts, feelings, perceptions and imaginings, some to be remembered, some
not. Any given moment of consciousness might likewise involve combined emotions,
each multiply complicated by its history of associations with thoughts, images and mem-
ories. In short, what is given by nature by way of emotional equipment does not deter-
mine consciousness but merely provides it materials to be processed into the medium of
the operations of its own economy. Affects, once their parasitical work is done, are swiftly
parasited in turn by the broader psychic system.
specifically, following Luhmann’s provocative suggestions regarding the role
of expectations and claims in social and emotional life, I propose that a partic-
ularly productive point of entry is to examine the relationships between rights
and emotions.
The emotions/rights complex
It should be clear enough that one need not assume that emotions belong
straightforwardly to the psychic domain and rights to the social. Emotions, as I
have argued, are threshold phenomena in which the norms of social systems
are, as it were, bundled together with states of consciousness and bodily
processes. In this sense, they represent the site of an embodiment of conscious
human beings into the communications of a social order. Likewise, rights,
whether legal or moral, are certainly properties of social systems of communi-
cation. But they also play a psychological role. Rights symbolise institutionalised
expectations (Luhmann 1957). In this sense, a right is a symbolically mediated
form of social recognition. Laying claim to rights is a powerful way in which a
psychic system can render the environment predictable and operable. The
›possessor‹ of a right can expect others to recognise that right, and can draw
upon external social authority should that expectation be violated. Hence as
well as symbolising institutionalised expectations, rights, as Luhmann puts it,
mediate in their actualisation in concrete circumstances. Rights, both legal and
moral, thus serve to lend order to the flow of social communication, but in so
doing they also play a role in the consciousness of the individual whose
desires, claims and expectations are framed and structured. To the extent that
rights structure expectations on a psychic level, they also lend form or pattern
to emotions. Specifically, rights probabilise emotions, which is to say that they
make emotionality more or less probable, and they make the experience and
expression of specific emotions more or less probable.
It could be said that if emotions are the site of an embodiment of human beings
into social order, then rights are symbolic vehicles through which the social
involves, includes or assumes14 human beings into its communicative order.
Affective conscious life is assumed into the form of rights, whilst rights take
the expectations and desires of human beings into account, thereby rendering
them into the form of socially accountable actors or personae. It is no accident,
therefore, that typical enactments of emotions are immanently concerned with
issues of rights. Contempt, anger, resentment and disgust, for instance, repre-
sent the emotional condemnation of those who violate rights. If it is we our-
selves who violate right, then guilt, shame and humiliation target the self for
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14 Here I am using this word in its theological sense. Just as the Virgin was assumed from
earth to heaven, so biologically given affective potentiallities are assumed into the circula-
tion of the social order.
condemnation. When we turn to those whose rights have been violated, sym-
pathy, pity and compassion are the appropriate moral responses to their suf-
fering. These emotions are the right emotions to feel (Stenner, in press 1). This
does not, of course, mean that we do in fact always feel them. But it does mean
that their experience is probabilised by a combination of normative social
expectations, and expectations experienced by a reflexive consciousness. To
experience guilt, contempt and pity is, in this sense, to embody rights. They can
be envisaged as rights filled out with affective content, or as affect shaped into
the pattern of rights.
The identification of this internal connection between emotions and rights is
not new. It was central to Aristotle’s discussion of the passions15, and plays a
pivotal role in social constructionist theories of emotions (Averill 1982;
Sabini/Silver 1982; Harré 1986). Contrary to the proposition that specific emo-
tion words refer to specifiable empirical organic or psychic referents, the social
constructionist argument has been advanced to the effect that many emotions
are moral and hence social ›all the way down‹. To describe oneself as envious
or proud or ashamed, in this account, is to deploy a socially available discur-
sive resource to describe a social response to a social situation that in turn
serves social functions (Armon-Jones 1986). This argument is certainly a
strong one in the case of complex social emotions such as jealousy and envy.
Although such observations remain debatable, a key difference between jeal-
ousy and envy hangs on the question of whether a social object is understood
to be owned by an actor who fears its loss (jealousy), or whether it is coveted
by an actor to whom it does not yet belong (envy). The decisive difference
between these ›green‹ emotions is hence to be found in the social domain of
(perceived) rightful propriety and not in the organic domain of autonomic
functioning or neuro-chemistry. But this social ordering has its parallel in an
ordering of consciousness that may or may not occur simultaneously. To adapt
a famous Freudian formula, if envy secretly thinks ›where it is, I shall be‹, then
jealousy anxiously thinks ›where I am, it shall be‹.16
This immanent relationship between rights and emotions is on one level a
function of the linguistically mediated nature of consciousness. For Luhmann
(1995, 273), the »linguistic forming of consciousness« is one of the main forms
of structural coupling between psychic and social systems. But consciousness
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15 In his Rhetoric, for instance, Aristotle defines anger as »a desire for what appears to be a
revenge for what appears to be an insult«.
16 Stenner/Stainton Rogers (1998) have explored some of the many different ways in which
jealousy can be moralised. For example, a stark distinction exists (in ordinary understand-
ings amongst UK participants) between jealousy which follows an actual infraction (e.g.
the jealousy of a wife whose husband has betrayed her) and that which follows the mere
suspicion of an infraction. In the first case moral support is typically offered to the jealous
individual. In the second case the jealousy is more likely to be subjected to moral con-
demnation. At issue is clearly the question of the right to be jealous.
can also be socially directed by way of the fulfilment and disappointment of
expectations and claims. We should therefore expect profound and systematic
links to exist between patterns of emotional life and the structure and culture
of rights in different societies or within a given society at different historical
points. In the remainder of the paper I offer the sketch of just one very general
and broad example of such a shift in the emotions/rights complex: the so-called
shift to modernity. Needless to say, future work will be required to fill out this
sketch with appropriate detail. But for present purposes I hope that it suffices
to illustrate my theoretical point.
The transformation of rights and emotions in the shift to modernity
In Luhmann’s account, society underwent a catastrophic change around the
second half of the 18th century. The so-called shift to modernity is a transfor-
mation in the nature of the collective. Specifically, for Luhmann, it represents
the point at which a predominantly hierarchically differentiated European
social order begins to give way to functional differentiation. Instead of differ-
entiation occurring predominantly by way of whole groups or strata of people
with fixed roles and status positions, it begins to occur predominantly by way
of different forms of communication. Indeed, for Luhmann, modernity is the
evolutionary point at which discrete social systems such as law, politics, educa-
tion, economy, science and art each begin to achieve en masse the operative
closure necessary for autopoiesis. I have argued that the link between rights
and emotions concerns the embodiment of human beings into the commu-
nicative social order of the collective. If so, then any such massive shift in social
order requires a parallel re-distribution or re-patterning of emotional identifi-
cations and thereby emotional life. It likewise requires a re-working of the
concept and application of rights that might transform psychic expectations
through a re-structuring of socially recognised claims.
Regarding the latter, it is fairly standard practice to conveniently date the so-
called transition to modernity in the west with a dramatic shift in the concept
and use of rights. Specifically, we can point to the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789, and the American Bill of Rights of 1791.
These great declarations of rights constituted essential components of new
forms of political community based upon the Nation-State model. The con-
cept of natural rights upon which these declarations were based was also
novel. As Luhmann (1957) argues, rights in the pre-modern feudal order did
not belong to individuals as such. Rather, rights referred to an objectively
given social order, and their source was a balanced judgement concerning
existing social relations. Rights were intimately connected with justice, and a
just allocation of rights took into account the different standing and contribu-
tions of differently located social actors to the social good. Rights were hence
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tied to duties, and the legal order reflected the hierarchies of the social order,
which were in turn typically justified by way of natural or divine law (e.g. the
lex naturalis of Aquinas). The modern conception of natural rights, by contrast,
holds such rights to be inalienable attributes of human beings irrespective of
objective social or legal order. Such an account was first comprehensively
articulated by Hobbes, but Luhmann traces it back to a conception of ›subjec-
tive rights‹ that was influenced by the Franciscan Nominalists and then
refined in the early 17th century by figures such as Suárez and Grotius. After
Hobbes, basic rights are no longer seen as an objective thing, but as a funda-
mental attribute of the human subject (Verschraegen 2002).
In discussing the function of Grundrechte, Luhmann suggests that a condition
of possibility for functional differentiation is precisely that people are not pre-
defined by an accident of birth that includes them totally in a fixed social
group with its own stable heritage and destiny. On the contrary, the citizen of
a modern state must first of all be an individual. It would defeat the object of
functional differentiation if each person could belong and live in only one
social sub-system.Viewed in this light, the articulation of a new conception of
natural rights gives institutional support for the expectation that, before being
a member of a social group, a citizen is naturally an individual. If the fragile
figure of the individual is born with the modern state, then the juridico-politi-
cal figure of modern, natural, subjective, basic rights functions to bolster and
support that individual with the power of state-sanctioned expectation. This
means that ›the individual‹ is an essentially empty category. It is precisely the
negation of any totalising social definition of human nature. Natural rights
thus function to include or assume human beings into the functionally differ-
entiated social system. They are a largely unnoticed pre-condition of participa-
tion within modern society (Verschraegen 2002).
The suggestion that the figure of the individual is an essentially empty cate-
gory should not disguise the fact that the practical achievement of such ›empti-
ness‹ can be an arduous and Sisyphian task. The process of involvement or
inclusion in increasingly individualised forms of social order requires the
simultaneous detachment of the individual from the local, personalised and
stratified forms of order typical of hierarchically differentiated social systems.
Natural rights, I wish to argue, acquire their position at the foundation of
modern state constitutions because they both symbolise and potentially
enforce precisely this detachment from the old and involvement in the new.
Natural rights thus build into modern juridico-political systems the semantic
basis for a recurrent critique and sublation of traditional authority. It should be
clear that this dynamic of attachment and involvement profoundly concerns
the emotions in that it requires a re-organisation of emotional identifications
and a redistribution of emotional possibilities. It is significant, therefore, that
this transition to modernity was grasped in later self-descriptions (i.e. those
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self-descriptions of society offered by sociology) essentially as a move from
nature to society and from emotion to reason (Gemeinschaft → Gesellschaft,
mechanical → organic). In such descriptions, ›Enlightenment modernity‹ was
associated with reason and society, while ›traditional societies‹ were associ-
ated with emotion and nature.
On one level these descriptions of modernity as a move from emotion to rea-
son have some plausibility: Bureaucratic and calculative forms of rationality
did indeed come to proliferate (Luhmann 1998; Elias 1994), and to some
extent this did involve a push towards »affective neutrality« (Parsons 1951).
Likewise, broadly emotional notions such as vengeance, mental suffering,
malice, mercy and compassion – which played a comparatively fundamental
role in pre-modern European legal systems – largely disappear from modern
law as legal recognition is de-coupled from social esteem (Honneth 1996;
Jhering 1905). Indeed, the self-referentiality typical of modern functional
social sub-systems is gained thanks in part to the evolution of generalised
symbolic media specific to each. As soon as such media as power, money and
the juridical are available, for instance, autonomous political, economic and
legal communication can be performed with great specificity and efficiency in
a strictly determined, coded medium. Such medialised communication is
effectively immune from any face-to-face emotional communication in its
environment, and requires it neither as a motivating prompt nor as a justifica-
tion for its perpetuation.
But these self-descriptions of modernity tell only half of a paradoxical story.
Modernity involved a massive redistribution of emotion, rather than its simple
exclusion. This is nowhere clearer than in the fact that modern constitutions
place a right to individual self-actualisation and happiness at the very centre of
the nation-state. In the previous European order, ruled by Christianity in its
diverse forms, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that such
desires were treated with great caution as the timeless source of evil17. What is
excluded as the ultimate danger for pre-moderns (individual wilful desire for
happiness and pleasure) is installed at the very centre of the modern polity.
Likewise, the period during which this shift was in preparation was charac-
terised by an unprecedented intellectual concentration on the question of pas-
sions and affects. As I have argued elsewhere, answers to political questions
were being sought in a scientific analysis of human emotions (Stenner, in
press 2). Spinoza’s ethics is based on a becoming active made possible through a
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17 It is of course important to note the complexities of Christianity in this respect. For exam-
ple, the combative relationship to the passions typical of Augustine was considerably less
pronounced in Thomist theology, becomes the distinctive feature of puritanism, and fades
out completely with Deism. Also, Christianity obviously did not disappear with moder-
nity. Indeed, the doctrine of natural rights has clear foundations in the religious individu-
alism of Grotius and Suárez and the religiously inspired withdrawals of religion from pol-
itics of Hobbes, Locke etc.
detailed account of the affects. Descartes’ philosophy of mastery and domina-
tion involves a thorough analysis of the passions of the soul. The discussions of
passions, appetites and desires in Part I of Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) ground
the proposals for the Commonwealth outlined in Part II. In the classics from
the late 17th to mid 18th century one can even discern a trend whereby the
psychological questions concerning emotions are published in a separate work
which marginally precedes the publication of the political, legal or economic
work. Locke’s Essay concerning human understanding (1689) appears the year
before his Two treatises of government. Volume 2 of Hume’s Treatise of human
nature entitled On the passions (1739) is swiftly followed by the essays on polit-
ical economy, morals and ethics. Smith’s Theory of the moral sentiments (1759)
provided the ground for the later Wealth of nations. With Rousseau, the psy-
chology of emotion takes place in his novels. Julie (1761) precedes the Social
contract by one year, and Emile is published in the same year.
In fact, it was during the course of this intense scientific concern with passions
and affects that the very concept of ›emotion‹ was used for the first time as a
psychological term (Danziger 1997). As put by Graham Richards (in press):
»strictly speaking, no English speaker before the eighteenth century had any
[emotions], what they had were ›passions‹ and ›affections‹«. According to the
New Oxford English Dictionary, the term emotion originally had the physical
meaning of a »moving out« (e movere) before being used figuratively, in its
modern sense, to denote an »agitation or disturbance of mind« or »excited
mental state«. Hume, for instance, writes mostly of passions, but occasionally
mentions emotions. Whilst Hume does not appear to work with a consistent
and clear distinction between passions and emotions,18 the same cannot be
said for Henry Home (Lord Kames). According to Richards (in press) his Ele-
ments of criticism (1762) is the first attempt to theoretically elaborate a distinc-
tion between emotion and passion. Emotion refers to the pleasant or unpleas-
ant feelings caused – due to the constitution of our nature – by encountered
objects or persons. Emotions are antecedent to passions, which may or may
not develop from the desire generated in us by emotion. By the 19th century,
the term emotion: »finally replaced ›passion‹ and ›affection‹, restricting these
to ›strong emotion‹ and ›fond liking‹ respectively« (Richards, in press). Emo-
tions took over from passions as part of political discourse in which rights
became grounded in a scientific argument over the basic nature of human dri-
ves, desires and appetites. If natural rights were invented in their modern indi-
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18 For instance, in discussing the reflective impressions he says (Hume 1969, 327): »Of the
second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.« Later (328) he implies a
difference in intensity: »The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest
height; while those other impressions, properly call’d passions, may decay into so soft an
emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible«. Elsewhere (e.g. 462-3) they are used
as synonyms: »When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emo-
tion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick …«
vidualistic form by Hobbes, then the modern concept of emotion was no less a
modern invention. This double invention is no accident. With the emergence
of the modern nation state, politics became, in a certain new sense, emotional
while emotions became, symmetrically, political (Arendt 1990; Boltanski,
1999).
It seems clear, in sum, that the self-image of modernity as thoroughly rational
conceals a fundamental reorganisation of emotional possibilities and an
amplification of the significance of emotional life for politics. There are several
other historical themes that testify to this, which I can only briefly indicate
here. The most obvious is the emergence of a new discourse of romanticism
that celebrated the emotions in a manner with no parallel in the history of the
west. In romanticism, ethics become grounded in passions and in the celebra-
tion of individual and collective freedom. Second, the nation state itself
becomes an object of newly intensified emotional identification in the form of
the great 19th century waves of nationalism.Third is the well-documented split
between the public and private spheres wherein women and children were
allocated an emotional role in the private sphere of the family at the price of
exclusion from full citizenship as rights-bearing nationals (Benhabib 1987;
Young 1990). An examination of this development would illustrate the sense in
which we are dealing with a modern redistribution of affect, rather than its
exclusion. This can be further linked to the construction of a host of »emo-
tional others« whose alleged emotionality warrants their political exclusion
(black people, women, children, the working classes, Orientals, slaves). In each
case, the redistributions of affect are intimately related to the articulation,
application and contestation of rights.
The diachronic transformation of individual emotions
Finally, attention to the emotions/rights complex opens up new possibilities
for tracing the changing historical fate of specific emotions (Stearns/Stearns
1988). For example, I have already suggested that the ›green‹ emotions of jeal-
ousy and envy can be broadly distinguished with respect to their relationship
to rights. To the extent that the shift to modernity entailed a transformation of
rights, we should expect distinct changes in the socially available representa-
tions, prescriptions and evaluations (›semantics‹) pertaining to these emo-
tions. Although more detailed research is needed, there are strong indications
that support the hypothesis that jealousy has become less legitimate and
acceptable under modernity, whilst envy has become more so. Jealousy, for
instance, was once the defining passion of the Judeo Christian God, who
announces Himself more than once as a ›jealous God‹ capable of violently
defending the well-being and fidelity of His flock. As God’s own defining pas-
sion, jealousy is given a positive evaluation and features as an indispensable
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quality of patriarchal leadership. However, as Stearns (1989), Mullen (1991)
and Curt (1994) have shown, jealousy in modern times has come increasingly
to signify immaturity and lack of control. In the early 20th century, under the
influence of the quasi-medical gaze of scientific psychological discourse, jeal-
ousy was increasingly discussed and portrayed as a pathology that should be
identified and eliminated as soon as possible (ideally in its early manifestation
as ›sibling rivalry‹). Envy, on the other hand, was traditionally identified as one
of the more serious of the Seven Deadly Sins. In traditional social systems,
great efforts were made to avoid engendering the ›evil eye‹, and the negative
consequences of envy were well recognised and rehearsed in many an apho-
rism. During the modern period, envy comes to be treated more lightly.
Indeed, in English at least, the word is typically used as a way of expressing
benign admiration rather than malign destructive intent. It seems clear that in
today’s economic context of rampant consumerism, envy acquires a positive
motivational role necessary to projects of self-improvement. In short, today it
seems we are inclined to believe that the jealous God of the Old Testament
suffered from a serious personality disorder, and that the Deadly Sin of envy is
an advertising opportunity for the selling of cars.
My suggestion is that the ground for this double reversal of evaluations is to
be found in the transformed claims and expectations that follow from the
articulation and increasing influence of modern individualistic rights. To the
extent that jealousy involves a will to control and possess the other, it consti-
tutes an intrusion into the rights of individuals. To the extent that envy can be
transformed into a positive and competitive consciousness of the right to indi-
vidual possession, it becomes a resource for the shaping of the desires of a
self-contained, freely choosing (and purchasing) individual. Similar transfor-
mations for other emotions could be predicted.19 Stearns/Stearns’ (1988), for
instance, discuss an early modern (US puritan) shift in emphasis away from
describing responses to negative events as evoking sadness, and towards self-
descriptions that emphasise anger. The expression of anger, as discussed ear-
lier, is made more probable when a claim to a right is violated. Although the
Stearns’ do not discuss this issue, it seems relevant that during the period of
transformation they discuss the puritans became key players in the articulation
of a modern natural rights based democracy (Stackhouse 1984).
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19 Luhmann’s (1998) own work on the complicated growth of a modern discourse on love as
passion should be noted in this context.
Conclusion
I hope to have shown that even if the emotions were a ›blind spot‹ for Niklas
Luhmann, then this does not alter the fact that his systems theory offers rich
resources for a socio-psychology or sociology of emotions. There is no doubt
that Luhmann’s account of the emotions is too narrowly cognitive and under-
estimates the organic and social roles they play. Nevertheless, I wish to con-
clude by emphasising that certain ›alexithymic‹ qualities of the theory are
deliberate and strategic choices on the part of the author. One of Luhmann’s
main concerns was to avoid the mistake of attempting to ground, legitimate,
explain and understand social systems by way of psychological arguments
about the essence of the human being. For Luhmann, this was the principal
mistake of the Enlightenment, which strove to deduce the nature of society
from the logic of a supposedly essential human rationality. As I suggested ear-
lier, this essential psychic basis of the polity was often identified with the logic
of affect. He argues instead for a soziologische Aufklärung capable of under-
standing the evolution of society in terms of an internal logic proper to social
systems themselves, not psychic systems. Any such project would necessarily
remain critical of arguments to reinstate a logic of affect as the basis and motor
of social systems. Indeed, for Luhmann modernity is understood socially as
the evolutionary point at which social sub-systems achieve the operative clo-
sure necessary for autopoiesis and hence functional differentiation. As dis-
cussed earlier, this development entails a highly medialised form of communi-
cation that precisely minimises (but never eliminates) the role of face-to-face
emotional encounters.
Nevertheless, the current trend towards stressing the value and importance of
emotion to psychic and social life is not surprising, and should itself be
analysed socially. It is clear that over the past fifty years or so emotional commu-
nications have become more and more fundamental to the operations of late
modern social systems. The fact that this development is deeply controversial
testifies to its existence. Hence legal theorists talk of an unwelcome shift from
the jurisdiction of law to the »jurisdiction of emotions« (Garapon 1996). The
education system has become ›child centred‹, stressing dialogue and emotional
engagement over didactic and rational instruction. Politicians now sport caring
and smiling facial expressions where once it was compulsory to look stern and
disciplined, and ›spin doctors‹ present ›feel good‹ versions of policies. Econom-
ics is said to have shifted its emphasis in the wealthy North Atlantic from pro-
duction to consumption, and hence concerns itself with the maximisation of
positive affect. Debates rage over the concern that the mass media have trans-
formed serious political and social debate into the excitement and enjoyment of
entertainment and infotainment. The culture industry and entertainment busi-
ness now contribute significantly to GNP. Even scientists are striving to present
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themselves as humane and engaged observers of the oneness of Gaia, and to
avoid the rational stereotypes of Mr Spock and Dr Strangelove. In the context
of this new ›affective climate‹ that leaves no sub-system unaffected, it is pre-
dictable that social theorists from various traditions should come to identify the
essence of humanity with the figure of the emotionally aware and expressive
individual. It is predictable that the repressed and rational Victorian should
become a favourite negative self-image for emotionally emancipated late-mod-
erns. And it is predictable that new psychological and medical categories such
as ›alexithymia‹, ›emotional literacy‹ and ›emotional intelligence‹ should be
coined and deployed.
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